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1. INTRODUCTION 
While there is a large literature on the determinants of 
technological innovation (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975; Scherer, 1980), 
most of it has been in the context of developed countries, 
particularly the United States. There is little systematic study of 
the determinants of inventive activity in the manufacturing sectors of 
the less~developed countries. Yet in these countries inventive 
activity, although at a low level, appears to be growing rapidly. It 
is also possible that the returns to innovative effort are much 
greater in the less-developed countries than in the developed 
countries because of the scope for complementarity between invention 
and imitation of existing technology. 
An attempt is made in this paper to study the determinants of 
innovation in the manufacturing sector of India, using industry-level 
data over the period 1960 to 1970. Our approach differs from earlier 
approaches in that we embed the demand for inventive activity in a 
conventional system of factor demand equations. Since foreign 
technology purchase, either outright or on a licensing basis, is an 
alternative (possibly complementary) to in-house research and 
development for a firm in a less-developed country, the demand for 
foreign technology is also included in the demand system. This allows 
us to look at the substitutability/complementarity relationships, say, 
between production labor and local innovation activity or between non-
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production labor and foreign technology use. We also include several 
policy variables, such as the presence of multinationals, the level of 
international inventive activity, the size of the public sector, and 
average firm size in an industry, as fixed factors in the system, and 
are able to observe the reduced-form effect of these factors on 
inventive activity and on foreign technology use within the framework 
of the demand system. 
The empirical results suggest that inventive activity as well as 
foreign technology purchase are not strongly related to average firm 
size in the Indian context. International inventive ~ctivity, on the 
other hand, has strong positive effects on both local innovation and 
foreign technology purchase, which suggests that it increases the pool 
of inventions that can be both imitated and produced within India as 
well as licensed or sold to India. The presence of the foreign sector 
within an industry is associated with less local innovation, while 
that of the public sector is associated with more local innovation. 
All of these findings have important policy implications which are 
discussed later in the paper. 
2. LOCAL INNOVATION AND THE USE OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA 
Although the level of inventive activity in India is low relative 
to the developed countries and the semi-industrialized countries 
(e.g., Brazil and South Korea), it has been growing quite rapidly over 
time. Table 1 shows the expenditures on research and development 
(R&D) and on foreign technology purchase by all private and public 
sector companies in India from 1964-65 to 1969-70. R&D expenditure is 
observed to have grown at a trend rate of 26.0 per cent per annum over 
this short period. In contrast, expenditure on foreign technology 
purchase increased at a rate of 16.2 per cent per annum.~ 
In Table 2, the number of patents granted to Indian nationals -- a 
crude measure of inventive output -- are shown for the period 1954-57 
to 1967-70 for each of 15 major industries. In no industry did the 
level of patenting fall over this period. Further, patents grew at a 
trend rate of over 10 per cent per annum in almost half of these 
industries, viz., food processing, textile products, chemicals, basic 
metals, metal products, machinery, and transport equipment. The 
average rate of growth of patenting by nationals was 8.4 per cent per 
annum over the period. There has thus been a rapid growth of 
inventive activity in Indian manufacturing at least during the decade 
of the 1960s. At the same time, the use of foreign technology has 




R & D Expenditures and Payments for Foreign Technology: 
Indian Industries, 1964-1965 to 1969-1970 
(In Millions of Rupees) 
R & D Expenditure Royalty and Technical 
on Current and Fee Payments 
Year Capital Account for Foreign Technology 
1964-65 105.1 76.9 
1965-66 143.7 101.6 
1966-67 178.2 142.4 
1967-68 261.7 133.3 
1968-69 310.7 162.2 
1969-70 378.5 183.1 
Trend rate of growth 
over the period 26.0 16.2 
Source: Reserve Bank of India; Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry: 
Second Survey Report, 1974, Bombay (India), pp. 25 and 138. 
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Table 2 
Number of Patents Granted to Nationals in India, 
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3. THE MODEL 
The framework we use to study the twin decisions of inventive 
activity and foreign technology purchase is the standard demand system 
framework. We incorporate the two firm decisions within a 
conventional system of factor demand equations arising out of cost­
minimizing behavior by the firm. Using the duality theorems of Uzawa 
(1964), Shephard (1970), and McFadden (1978), it is possible to 
completely describe the nature of the production technology from the 
cost function. In what follows, we shall assume that firms minimize 
the costs of producing a given output subject to a production function 
which includes own inventive activity and foreign technology as factor 
inputs. 
Duality theory imposes strict restrictions on the specification and 
estimation of factor demand equations. For instance, symmetry 
restrictions across equations arising out of cost-minimizing or 
profit-maximizing behavior on the part of economic agents, as well as 
homogeneity restrictions derived from the underlying production 
technology, have to be generally imposed in the estimation of a factor 
demand system. These restrictions are not too difficult to implement 
when estimating a conventional and complete demand system, i.e., one 
in which quantity and price data are available for all inputs. In 
this paper, the presence of two inputs, innovation activity and 
foreign technology use, for which price data are not readily available 
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in fact, both factors have unobserved shadow prices requires a 
relaxation of this specification requirement. The choice of an 
appropriate functional form for the demand system will also depend to 
a large extent on this limitation in the data. Our approach in this 
paper is to estimate a system of demand equations which is easily 
estimable given the available data, with a minimum of prior 
restrictions imposed. 
Among the three most common flexible functional forms for a cost 
function -- the generalized Leontief, the translog, and generalized 
quadratic -- only the latter yields a system of factor demand 
equations that is estimable even in the absence of data for some 
prices in the system. We thus assume that the underlying technology 
is characterized by the cost function: 
(1) C = + 
b-. = JJ. i,j=l,n-1; iij;l..J 
where C = total costs, Q = total output, pi= price of the ith 
variable input, and Zk = level of the kth fixed factor. 
Equation (1) represents a generalized quadratic cost function (Fuss 
et.al., 1978; Lau, 1978) which is linear homogenous in input prices. 
The symmetry restrictions inherent in equation (1), viz., bij = bji JJ-
i,j=l,n-1; i~j, should be imposed for efficiency in estimating the 
factor demand equations corresponding to the cost function. 
Using Shephard's lemma and differentiating (1) with respect to Pi, 
we obtain the individual factor demand equations: 
n-1
(2) xi = 9C/api = ai + ; bij(pj/pn) + diQ +
J 
2r fik~ + r gik2k , .ll. i , 
k k 
bij = bji, Jf i,j=l,n-1; iJj i 
where Xi= quantity of the ith variable input. It is the system in 
equation (2) that is estimated in this paper. 
In estimating a system of industry demand equations derived from a 
cost function, two important.assumptions have been maintained. First, 
by using industry-level data for our analysis, we assume that the 
average firm in an industry is representative of all the firms in that 
industry. Although this is a restrictive assumption, it has been made 
before in {Griliches, 1967; Zarembka, 1970; Dennis and 
Smith, 1978) and is necessitated by the unavailability of firm-level 
data at this time. 2 Second, it is assumed that input prices and 
output are exogenous variables at the industry level. This is not 
not an unreasonable._ ·.. ·assumption in the Indian context, where 
government intervention in the form of capacity licensing and price 
setting has been very common at least during the decade of the 1960s 
{Bhagwati and Desai, 1970). It is, therefore, not unrealistic to 
. . ' ' 
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characterize Indian firm behavior as that of minimizing costs for 
given levels of input prices and output. 
The treatment of technology purchase as measured by payments of 
royalty and technical fees and localized inventive activity as vari­
able factors of production requires more justification. These activ­
ities are normally viewed in an investment framework. Our reasons for 
treating them as variable inputs are twofold. First, both activities 
have a real element of variability. Second, the conventional investment 
framework has not proven to be very illuminating for the questions that 
we have in mind. 
/ Technology purchase is quite variable since many of the contractual 
arrangements are quite short term in nature. Technical assistance~ for 
example, is often provided only for short periods and arrangements can 
be changed quite rapidly. Invention by Indian firms tends also to be 
quite adaptive and while it has an investment component the time period 
over which an investment is superior is relatively short. 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATION 
The variables used in the analysis, and their means a.nd standard 
deviations, are listed in Table 3. (See the Appendix for data 
sources.) A total of five variable inputs are distinguished: 
production labor, non-production labor, fuel, patenting in India by 
nationals, and royalty and technical fee payments for foreign 
technology. Capital is treated as a fixed factor, and not a variable 
input, since government capacity licensing makes capital stock 
exogenous to the firm•s decisions, at least in the short run. 
While data on production labor are available in·man-hours, data on 
non-production labor are available only in numbers of employees. 
Patenting in India by nationals is used as a proxy for local inventive 
input (and not for inventive output, as it is the case in much of the 
literature), since industry-specific data on R&D expenditures or R&D 
personnel are not available for the period 1960-70. While patenting 
is a crude proxy for inventive activity, particularly in India where a 
system of utility models or 11petty11 patents (minor adaptive 
inventions) does not exist, almost all other quantitative measures of 
inventive activity, including R&D expenditures, are also likely to be 
crude proxies for inventive input. Most of the R&D conducted in less­
developed countries is informal or 1 blue-collar 1 R&D, which is largely 
conducted outside the formal R&D divisions of companies! At the same 
time, the companies that do have R&D divisions have a strong incentive 
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Table 3 
Variable Means: Indian Industries 1960-1970 
Production Labor a (in m.an-hours) 
Number of Non-Production Workersa 
Fuel Consumption(= Expenditure on 
Fuel f Fuel Price Index)a 
Technology Imports (Royalty and 
Technical Fee Payw.ents for 
Foreign Know-How)a 
Domestic Patenting (Number of Patents 
X 1000 Granted to Nationals in India)a 
W (Hourly Wage Rate for Production 
Eabor) 
W (Annual Wage Rate for Non-
~reduction Workers) 
PF (Price Index for Fuel)b 
USPATNTS (Cum. No. of Patents Granted 
in USA over previous 5 years)a 
FORSHARE (Share of Equity Held by 
Foreigners over the Period 
1965-1970)c 
PUBSHARE (Share of Production in 
Public-Sector Enterprises over 
Period 1970-1973)c 
FIXEDCAP (Fixed Capital Stock 
in Rupees)a 
OUTPUT (Gross Output in Rupees)a 

















































aVariable has been divided by the total number of firms in the industry. The 
means, therefore, reflect the situation of the average firm in the industry. 
bVariable varies only with time. 
cTime-invariant variable. 
dinclude.all food manufacturing, beverage, tobacco, textile spinning and weaving, 
·and knitting industries. 
einclude basi~ industrial chemicals (including fertilizer), miscellaneous chemical 
products, petroleum and coal products, and cement industries. 
£Include metal products, machinery, electrical machinery and equipment, transport 
equipment, railroad equipment, and automobile and cycle industries. 
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to overstate their R&D expenditures, since the Indian tax system 
allows liberal concessions for company R&D expenditure. 
Royalty and technical fee payments for foreign technology is used 
as a proxy for foreign technology input. Since the variable is 
expressed in terms of expenditure on foreign technology purchase, the 
estimated elasticities from this equation have to be interpreted as 
expenditure, and not quantity, elasticities. There are data problems 
with the foreign technology payments variable. Since there are 
government restrictions on profit repatriation by foreign companies 
based in India, there is always a strong incentive for these companies 
to engage in overinvoicing of foreign technology imports, especially 
when these originate from their parent companies abroad. While it is 
important to be aware of these data limitations, little can be done 
about them. Since we treat both patents granted to nationals and 
payments for foreign technology as endogenous variables, errors of 
measurement are part of the general error structure of this model. 
Data on three prices the wage rate for production labor, the 
wage rate for non-production employees, and the price index for fuel 
-- are available. The latter varies only over time, not across 
industries. We have included a variable measuring international 
inventive activity which we treat as a proxy for the 11price 11 of both 
domestic invention and foreign technology purchase. The price or cost 
of domestic invention is lowe.red by an increase in international 
inventive activity, because adaptive invention is made easier. The 
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real price of foreign technology is also lowered by an increase in 
international inventive activity, since the latter shifts the supply 
curve of internationally-available technology. Homogeneity 
restrictions have,however, been applied only to the actual price terms 
in the estimation procedure. 
Four fixed factors or Z variables have been included in the system. 
These are the fixed capital stock, the share of equity held by 
foreigneis, the share of output produced in public-sector (state­
owned) firms, and the cumulative number of patents granted in the 
United States (to nationals and foreigners) over the previous five 
years. The latter is a proxy for the rate of nternational innovation 
activity. One of the important concerns in this paper is the 
relationship between patenting by nationals in India and international 
patenting. The latter could have either a blocking effect on Indian 
patenting, in which case the relationship would be negative, or a 
disclosure effect, in which case the relationship would be positive. 
The total sample includes observations on SO three- and four-digit 
manufacturing industries over the period 1960-70. The sample of 
industries has been divided into three groups: light industries, 
comprising food processing, beverages and tobacco, textile spinning 
and weaving, and knitting industries; chemical industries, comprising 
basic industrial chemicals (including fertilizer}, miscellaneous 
chemical products, petroleum and coal products, and cement industries; 
and engineering industries, comprising metal products, machinery, 
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electrical machinery and equipment, transport equipment, and 
automobile and cycle industries. For estimation purposes, cross­
sectional and time-series data have been pooled within each of the 
three groups. We thus assume a high degree of similarity of 
technologies within each of the three industry groups. A full set of 
three-digit industry dummies has been included in the systems to 
isolate industry shift effects.4 
Since the industry-level variable are totals over a varying number 
of firms in each industry, all dependent and independent variables, 
with the exception of the output share of the public sector and the 
equity share of the foreign sector, have been divided by the number of 
firms in the industry prior to estimation. This procedure removes a 
potential source of heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the demand 
equations. 
The systems shown in equation (2) have been estimated jointly by 
the iterative Zellner (1963) method, taking account of error 
interdependence and s~'Ti®etry restrictions across equations. This 
assures us of efficient estimates for the systems. Note that since 
all the prices have been divided by the price of fuel (to impose 
homogeneity of degree zero in prices on the demand equations), the 
symmetry restrictions in effect apply only to the production and non­
production labor demand equations. 
5. SOME HYPOTHESES 
The cost function model predicts the own-price effects on factor 
demand to be negative. Furthermore, since more output cannot be 
produced with less of any input (assuming that the firm is cost­
minimizing), the effect of output level on factor demand will 
generally be positive. These are the predictions readily based on 
theory. We can, however, provide further plausible hypotheses. 
It is unlikely that production and non-production labor are 
substitutes for each other, since the two types of labor perform very 
different (complementary) tasks. One could almost regard non­
production employees as support staff for production workers in a 
firm, in which case the two types of labor would be strong 
complements. Fuel and production labor are also likely to be 
complements to each other, while the relationship between non­
production labor and fuel is difficult to predict. If domestic 
inventive activity is primarily labor-saving, production labor and 
local patenting will be substitutes for each other. On the other 
hand, non-production labor, which includes technicians and scientists 
who are engaged in inventive activity, may well be complementary to 
patenting by nationals in India. In fact, however, technicians and 
scientists are likely to constitute such a small proportion of the 
non-production labor force that the complementarity between them and 




International inventive activity is hypothesized to have an adverse 
effect on labor demand, since most inventions developed in the Western 
countries (and subsequently imitated in or imported into India} are 
labor saving. International patenting {proxied by patenting in the 
United States) can have two opposite effects on Indian patenting. If 
U.S. patents are primarily used by international companies for 
bl_ocking purposes, they will have an adverse effeet on Indian 
patenting. However, U.S. patenting can also have a disclosure effect 
whereby Indian companies can learn of an invention which they would 
otherwise not have known about, modify it, and patent an adapted 
invention in India. By increasing the pool of knowledge from which to 
learn,- imitate, and adapt, international inventions can have a 
positive effect on Indian inventive activity. The net effect of 
international inventive activity on Indian innovation will depend on 
the relative magnitudes of the blocking and disclosure effects. 
The ~"pact of international inventive activity on the purchase of 
foreign technology is closely related to its impact on local 
inventive activity. If international inventions result in increased 
local innovations, and if local innovation and foreign technology 
purchase are substitutes for each other, the relationship between 
international inventive activity and foreign technology purchase will 
be negative. On the other hand, if international inventions depress 
local innovation, the relationship will be positive. 
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The effect of foreign ownership on local inventive activity is 
hypothesized to be negative, since a foreign company in India is more 
likely to use innovations developed by its parent company in the home 
country than to do its own R&D locally. In a survey of U.5.-based 
multinational corporations, Mansfield et.al. (1979) found that, on 
average, 29 to 34 per cent of the profit returns from R&D projects 
came from overseas exploitation. The multinationals estimated that 
their R&D budgets would be reduced from 12 to 15 per cent if they were 
unable to pass innovations on to their foreign subsidiaries. This 
observation suggests that, holding other things constant, foreign 
companies in India will tend to import more technology from abroad 
(especially from their parent companies) than locally-owned companies. 
(Since the foreign technology input in this paper is defined in terms 
of expenditure, it is not possible to separate the (hypothesized) 
positive effect of foreign ownership on foreign technology use from 
its effect on overinvoicing of technology imports, which is likely in 
a situation where there are government curbs on profit repatriation. 
A positive relationship between foreign ownership and foreign 
technology imports may, therefore, imply that foreign companies in 
India are using more foreign technology than locally-owned companies 
or that they are paying a higher price per unit of foreign 
technology. ) 
The size of the public sector in an industry is also likely to be 
an important variable in explaining local inventive activity and 
reliance on foreign technology. One of the important motives for 
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establishing public-sector companies in India was to promote self­
reliance and independence in national technological needs (Industry 
Policy Resolution of 1948). Public-sector companies thus have a 
mandate to engage in substantial research and development. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that some of the largest in-house R&D 
laboratories in ·India often belong to state-owned enterprises. Many 
Indian public-sector companies are engaged today in technology exports 
to other less-developed countries! We, therefore, expect the size of 
the public sector in an industry to be positively related to inventive 
activity in that industry and -- assuming local inventive activity and 
foreign technology to be substitutes for each other -- negatively 
related to foreign technology use. 
Finally, the relationship between inventive activity and firm size 
is of interest, since it has produced a large literature in the 
context developed countries. The general evidence from developed 
countries is that, with the possible exception of the chemical 
industry, the intensity of research effort (i,e,, rP~P~rrh effort 
deflated by a measure of firm size) does not increase with firm size. 
This implies that the elasticity of research effort with respect to 
firm size is positive but less than unity (Worley, 1961; Hamberg, 
1966; Mueller, 1967; Mansfield, 1968). In some cases, research 
intensity has been found to initially increase but then decrease with 
firm size (again with the exception of the chemical industry) 
(Scherer, 1965a; Grabowski, 1968). Most of the above studies have 
used R&D expenditure as percentage of sales or R&D employees as 
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percentage of total employees as their dependent variables. 
Studies that have used patents as a measure of inventive activity 
have generally found the relationship between the absolute number of 
patents granted and firm size to have an inverted U-shape (Scherer, 
1965b; Johannisson and Lindstrom, 1971). This suggests that"··· 
beyond some magnitude, size does not appear especially conducive to 
either innovational effort or output in either ~his country or in 
European countries where studies have been conducted ••• It seems 
noteworthy that the chemical industry is cited as an exception both 
for the U.S. and abroad 11 (Kamien and Schwartz, 1975, p. 19). 
In this paper, the fixed capital stock and output variables will 
provide a measure·of firm size effects. On the basis of the results 
obtained in other countries, we expect domestic patenting to increase 
at a diminishing rate with firm size. 
6. RESULTS 
The regression results for the light, chemical, and engineering 
industry groups are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
The results are generally good in that they are largely consistent 
with the predictions of production theory. For instance, out of a 
total of nine own-pr~ce effects that have been estimated (three for 
each industry group}, only one has the wrong sign (and this is 
not significant). Six of the nine own-price effects have the right 
signs and are significantly different from zero. Furthermore, with 
the exception of domestic patenting, all inputs have positive output 
effects, as would be expected of non-inferior inputs. Finally, the 
symmetry restrictions across equations can be rejected only for the 
engineering industries. 
A large number of the coefficients on the squared fixed factor 
variables are significant, indicating the presence of non-linearities 
in input demand with respect to the fixed factors. Because the fixed 
factors enter the demand equations both in linear and quadratic form, 
the partial derivatives of the inputs with respect to the fixed 
factors vary wi t_h the levels of the fixed factors. The partial 
derivatives have been evaluated at the sample means of each industry 
group and reported in Table 7. 
Finally, the elasticities of demand with respect to prices and with 
respect to the fixed factors (including output) have been computed and 
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Table 4 
Estimated System of Factor Demand Equations -
Light Industries, India, 1960-70 
(Normalized Quadratic Cost Function) 
(asymptotic t-statistic in parentheses) 
Independent Production Non-Production Technology Domestic 





















USPATNTS -2,099.06* -0.04* 2.35* 409.68* 4.26* 
(-4.9) (-4.2) (2.8) (8.2) (14.2) 











FORSHARE 4,168,019* -65.66 14,235.4* -213,083.2 -347.76 
(1.9) (-1.4) (3.3) (-0.8) (-0.2) 
FORSHARE -87,365.52* 1.35 -295.42* 4,335.47 7.76 
Squared (-1.9) (1.4) (-3.3) (0.8) (0.2) 
PUBSHARE 1,476,072* -12.36 3,945.81* -79,567.92 -73.39 
(2.4) (-0.9) (3.2) (-1.1) (-0.2) 
PUBSHARE -168,779.6* 1. 71 · -484.30* 9,582.17 10.58 
Squared (-2.2) (LO) (-3.2) (1. 7) _(0.2) 
FIX~CAP 1,818.81 0.16* 11.21* -68.57'" -0.31 
(XlO ) (1.5) (6.2) (4.5) (-0.5) (-0.4) 











r\TTTPTT'T'_..., ... ~ ZL• ~a,:::._,_, V • aa* _, .,,r 0.02* , nn*.._.v,.,,. 7 /, ~ I •~.J -0.09* 
cx10·) (6.1) (11.2) (7.8) (LO) (-2. 0) 
YEAR -62,937.33* -0.48* -63.95* 6,060.67* 43.40* 
(-4.8) (-1.7) (-2.4) (3.9) (4.6) 
Notes: 1) Equations have been estimated jointly by Generalized Least Squares 
Zellner, 1963). Symmetry restrictions across equations (1) and (2), 
as well as zero homogeneity in prices for each equation, have been 
imposed. 
2) A full set of three-digit industry dummies as well as an intercept 
were included in each equation. The coefficients on these terms have 
not been reported in the table due to space limitations. 
3) For a description of the variables, see Table 3. 
4) ~Significant at the 0.10 level of significance. 
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Table 5 
Estimated System of Factor Demand Equations -
Chemical Industries, India, 1960-70 
(Normalized Quadratic Cost Function) 


















FI~CAP 681. 95* 
(XlO ) (9.1) 
FIXEDCAP -390.19*12Squared (XlO. ) (-4.4) 
l'tTT'T'DTT'T' , , ') C: C: ,I, 
































Fuel Imports Patenting 
-513,440 1,202,555 1,386.30 
(-1.0) (0.1) (0.1) 
93.18* -1,105.35 -0.92 
(2. 3) (-1.3) (-0.8) 
-2.62 231.92* 1.35* 
(-0.4) (1. 6) (6. 7) 
0.43 -570.89 -2.76* 
(O.O) (-1.4) (-5.0) 
-1.38 -3,414.09 -57.90* 
(-0.0) (-0.3) (-4.0) 
2. 77 101.14 1.33* 
(0.2) (0.4) (3.7) 
409.00 4,327.99 22.53* 
(1.3) (0. 7) (2.5) 
-7.56 -89.81 .-0.52* 
(-1.1) (-0. 7) (-2. 7) 
5.54* 3.72 0.05 
(3.8) (0.1) (1.3) 
-2.91* -21.39 -0.03 
(-1.7) (-0.6) (-0.6) 
3.19* n c:,VeJ/ n nt:,1,-v.uvn 
(4.1) (O.O) (-2.6) 
-879.78* 9,595.8 20.06* 
(-2.7) (LS) (2.2) 
Notes: 1) Equations have been estimated jointly by Generalized Least Squares 
(Zellner, 1963). Symmetry restrictions across equations (1) and (2), 
as well as zero homogeneity in prices for each equation, have been 
imposed. 
2) A full set of three-digit industry dummies as well as an intercept were 
included in each equation. The coefficients on these terms have not been 
reported in the table due to space limitations. 
3) For a description of the variables, see Table 3. 




Estimated System of Factor Demand Equations -
Engineering Industries, India, 1960-70 
(Normalized Quadratic Cost Function) 
(asympotic t-statistic in parentheses) 
Independent Production Non-Production Technology Domestic 
Variables Labor Labor Fuel Imports Patenting 
W/PF -23,671,437 -4,913.27* -442,899* 68,330,770 17,727.50 
(-1.1) (-2.4) (-2.4) (1.3) (0.9) 
W/P/F -4,913.27* -21.79* 4.83 -13,359.15* -2.29 
(-2.4) (-10.0) (0.3) (-2.6) (-1.3) 
USPATNTS -35.36 0.15 0.010.01 396.00* 
(-0. 7) (0.2) (0.4) (3.2) · (0.02) 
USPATNTS -5.42 -0.01 -0.11 -57.19 0.07* 
Squared (XlO)4 (-0.1) (-0.2) (-0. 3) (-0.6) (2.1) 
FORSHARE 1,688,754* 142.08 6,290.64* 778,779 146.90 
(3.8) (0.3) (1.6) (O. 7) (0.4)
FORSHARE -34,416.85* -2.46 -128.21* -14,822.63 -3.04 
Squared (-3.9) (-0.3) (-1.7) (-0.6) (-0.4) 
PUBSHARE -48,569.65* -14.82* -100.32* 2,243.76 9.65 
(-6.9) (-1.8) (-1.6) (0.1) (1.5) 
PUBSHARE 618.63 0.880.14* -24.32 -0.08 
Squared (8.3) (1.6) (1.4) (-0.1) (-1.3) 
FIX~CAP 1,853.49* 0.06 3.21 -938.98 -0.39* 
(XlO ) (7. 7) (0.2) (1.5) (-1.5) (-1.8) 
FIXEDCAP -2,876.94* 0.12 -4.27 1,683:30 0.52 
Squared (XlO12) (-6.0) (0.2) (-1.0) (1.4) (L2) 
OUTPUT 235.18* 0.22 4.44* 595.22* 0.18 
(1.8) (1.5) (3.9) (1.8) (1.5) 
YEAR -34, 721. 31* -85.39* -153.71 -36,048.52 -25.10* 
(-2.1) (-4.4) (-1.1) (-0.8) (-1.7) 
Notes: 1) Equations have been estimated jointly by Generalized Least Squares
(Zellner, 1963). Symmetry restrictions across equations (1) and (2), 
as well as zero homogeneity in prices for each equation, have been 
imposed. 
2) A full set of three-digit industry dummies as well as an intercept 
were included in each equation. The coefficients on these terms 
have not been reported in the table due to space limitations. 
3) For a description of the variables, see Table 3. 
4) *Significant at the 0.10 level of significance. 
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Table 7 
Partial Derivatives of Factor Demand with Respect 
to the Fixed Factors: Indian Industries, 1960-70 













Light USPATNTS -1, 772. 78* -0.03* 1.96* 345.67* 3.83* 
FORSHARE -516,520* 6.71 -1,605.02* 19,385 68.48 
PUBSHARE 227,103* 0.32 362.03* -8,659.86 4.89 
FIX.EDCAP 
x104) 
4,483.01* 0.20* 9.40* -82.30 -0.05 
Chemicals USPATNTS -41.74 0.03 -2.59 194.62* 1.17* 
FORSHARE -15, 711.62* ;..1.50 74.21 ..;.657 .04 -21.52* 
PUBSHARE 7,394.22 0.74 646.99 1,498.98 38.90* 
FIXERCAP 530.00* 0.06* 4.40* -4.63 0.04 
(XlO ) 
Enginee- USPATNTS -36.86 0.01 0.122 380.10* 0.03 
ring FORSHARE 90,435* 28.05 336.75 90,416 5.88 
PUBSHARE -26,089* -9.88* -68.07* 1,359.93 6.62 
FIXEDCAP 1,610 .00* 0.07 2.85 -800.00* -0.34* 
(X104) 
Notes: 1) All.d~rivatives have been calculated at the sample means of the independent 
variables, using the coefficients reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level of significance. 
shown in Tables 8 and 9, respectively, for each of the three industry 
groups. The tests of statistical significance reported for the 
partial derivatives and the elasticities are approximate, since they 
only take account of the variance of the estimated coefficients and 
not of the predicted values of the random variables. 
Some of the salient findings from the empirical analysis are: 
1) Production and non-production labor are observed to be 
complements, except in the case of chemical industries where there is 
no significant relationship between them. Non-production labor and 
fuel appear to be substitutes for each other, although the 
relationship between production labor and fuel demand is ambiguous. 
2) Patenting by nationals in India does not appear to be 
significantly responsive to prices, except in the of the lightcase 
industries. Even in these industries, the price elasticities, 
although statistically significant, are small in absolute magnitude. 
They suggest that local inventive activity is complementary to both 
production and non-production labor but substitutable for fuel. 
Foreign technology, on the other hand, appears to be good substitutea 
for non-production labor and fuel both in the light and engineering 
industries, but is not significantly related to non-production labor 
in any of the three industry groups. 
3) International inventive activity, as proxied by the total number 
of patents granted in the United States over the previous 5-year 
Table 8 
Own-and 8ross-Price Elasticities of Remand: 
Indian Industries, 1960-1970a, 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
!,,,-Elasticitr of: 
•-c; 
..,..-Industry With Production Non-Production Technology DomesticGroup Respect to: Labor Labor Fuel Imports Patenting 
Light WP -2.652* -0.277* 1.536* 1. 396* -0.003* 
(-10.3) (-6. 7) (2. 3) (2. O) (-5 .1) 
WN -0. 727* -0.390* 1.562* -0.443 -0.001* 
(-6. 7) (-5.7) (5. 5) (-1.5) (-4.4) 
PF -0.512* 0.039 -2.449* 2.919* 0.002* 
(-1.6) (0.2) (-3.1) (3.5) (2. 9) 
Chemicals -0.893* 0.093 0.803*WP -0.004* 0.001 
(-5.7) (0.9) (3.8) (-1.6) (0.6) 
WN 0.110 -0.344* 0.237 -0.004 0.001 
(0.9) (-2. 3) (LO) (-1.2) (O. 9) 
PF -0.330 0.486* -0.155 -0.000 -0.001 
(-1.1) (2.5) (-0.4) (-0.0) (-0.4) 
Enginee- WP -0.196 -0.250* 0.057 0.389* -0.001 
ring (-1.2) (-2.6) (0.4) (4.1) (-0.8) 
-0.143* ~3.887* 3.914* 0.115 0.001WN 
(-2.6) (-10.6) (7 .4) , (O. 3) (0.2) 
PF -0.948* 0.064 0.509 0.375* 0.001 
(-2.5) (0. 3) (1.4) (1. 7) (0.4) 
Notes: 
aElasticities have been evaluated at the sample means of each industry group.
The coefficients used in calculating the elasticities have been taken from 
Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
bSince all prices have been normalized by the fuel price in the estimated 
equation, no symmetry has been imposed between the fuel price effects on 
labor demand and the wage effects on fuel demand. As such, the signs of 
these effects may not be the same. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level of significance• 
...-.:;..:.. 
Table 9 
Output and Fixed Factor Elasticities of Demand: 
Indian Industries, 1960-1970a 
Elasticity of 
Industry With Production Non-Production Technology Domestic 
Group Respect to: Labor Labor Fuel Imports Patenting 
Light USPATNTSb -0.327* -0.119* 0.218* 1.308* 1.128* 
FORSHAREb -0. 751* 0.205 -1.404* 0.578 0.159 
PUBSHARE 0.330* 0.010 0.317* -0.258 0.011 
FIXEDCAP 0.658* 0.617* 0.830* -0.248 -0.013 
OUTPHT 0.297* 0.242* 0.453* 0.114 -0.108* 
YEAR -0.092* -0.015* -0.056* 0.181* 0.101* 
Chemicals USPATNTSb -0.012 0.099 -0.065 1.107* 2.120* 
FORSHAREb -0.014* -0.013 0.006 -0.011 -0.120* 
PUBSHARE 0.007 0.007 0.050 0.026 0.216* 
FIXEDCAP 0.947* 1.075* 0.664* -0.157 0.464 
OUTPHT 0.260* 0.021 0.622* 0.025 -0.809* 
YEAR -0.105* -0.073* -0.068* 0.167 0.111* 
Enginee­ USPATNTSb -0.059 0.055 0.051 0.557* 0.196
ring FORSHAREb 0.105* 0.111 0.101 0.095 0.027 
PUBSHARE -0.030* -0.039* -0.020* 0.001 0.030 
FIXEDCAP 0.785* 0.123 0.360 -0.356 -0.655* 
OUTPRT 0.169* 0.553 0.827* 0.391* 0.499 
YEAR -0.040* -0.338* -0.046 -0.038 -0.114* 
Notes: 
aElasticities have been evaluated at the sample means of each industry group
us;Tlg the coefficients reported in Tables 
only for those coefficients significantly different from zero at the 0.10 
level of significance. 
b The figures in these rows are partial elasticities. That is, they show the 
percentage change in the dependent variable due to a 1 unit increase in the 
independent variable. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level of significance. 
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period, does adversely affect the demand for production and non-
production labor, as we had hypothesized, but only in the light ~ 
industry group. (In the other industry groups, it has no significant -,,, 
effect on labor demand.) It also has a positive effect on fuel demand 
in light industries. 
4) The relationship between local and international inventive 
activity is observed to be positive and strong. For every one per 
cent increase in U.S. patenting, there is a two per cent increase in 
Indian patenting in the chemical industries and a slightly more than 
one per cent increase in the light industries. This indicates that 
the disclosure effect of U.S. patenting on Indian patenting is greater 
in magnitude than its blocking effect. However, the increased level 
of Indian patenting is not accompanied by a decline in the use of 
foreign technology by Indian firms, as we had hypothesized. Instead, 
U.S. patenting is observed to stimulate foreign technology purchase by 
Indian firms. This suggests that local innovation and foreign 
technology use are complements to, not substitutes for, each other. 
In other words, before being applied successfully to production 
act1vities, foreign technology needs to be extensively worked on and 
adapted to local conditions. This requires that firms which import 
more foreign technology also perform more R&D and inventive work than 
firms not importing technology from abroad. 
A comparison of the elasticities of local patenting and of foreign 
technology purchase with respect to U.S. patenting reveals that the 
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latter is greater than the former in light and engineering industries, 
but that the reverse is true in the chemical industries. Thus, while 
international inventive activity does stimulate local innovation by 
Indian firms via a strong disclosure effect, it also encourages more 
use and import of foreign technology by these firms. The net effect 
of international inventive activity on Indian self-reliance in 
technological needs may thus well be negative, especially in the case 
of the light and engineering industries. 
5) Foreign and public sector ownership are not associated 
significantly with local innovation or foreign technology purchase, 
except in the chemical industries where local patenting is observed to 
vary negatively with the level of foreign control and positively with 
the size of the public sector (as we had hypothesized). 
6) Firm size, as proxied by the fixed capital stock and output, 
does not appear to have a significant positive association with 
patenting in any of the industry groups. In the light and chemical 
industries, capital and capital squared do not have significant 
effects on patenting, although output does have a significant negative 
effect. On the other hand, in the engineering industries, the output 
coefficient is not significant, while the fixed capital stock 
coefficient is significantly negative. On the whole, then, it appears 
that inventive activity and firm size are not positively related. The 
results suggest that the relationship, if anything, is negative. 
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7) Holding all other factors constant, a steady rate of growth of 
domestic patenting (of approximately 10 per cent per annum) is 
observed in the light and chemical industry groups. In the 
engineering industry group, however, patenting appears to have a 
significant negative trend over time (-11.4 per cent per annum). 
8) Several other interesting findings -- which are not the primary 
focus of this paper -- emerge from the empirical analysis. For 
instance, the demand for production labor is observed to depend 
negatively on foreign ownership and positively on public sector 
ownership in the light and chemical industries. Interestingly, the 
relationship is exactly reversed in the engineering industries, where 
public-sector firms appear ceteris paribus to use fewer production 
workers than other firms and foreign companies appear to use more. 
The estimated elasticities of production labor demand with respect to 
capital stock are positive but less than unity in all industries, 
suggesting that the incremental labor:capital ratio falls with firm 
~;,._,, in Tnni.::in m.::in11f'.::it"'t-t1ring. ll.rlrlit-inn::o11y, we find that the demand 
for both production and non-production labor has been steadily falling 
over time, holding wages and other factors constant, across all 
industries. 
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Assuming that the goals of Indian policy makers are to encourage 
local inventive activity by Indian firms and discourage reliance on 
foreign technology, several policy prescriptions are suggested by the 
empirical results. First, the wages of production workers in the 
manufacturing sector, which are already at artifically high levels 
relative to the supply of labor in urban and rural markets, could be 
reduced. This would have the twin effects of increasing the demand 
for production and non-production labor (since the two are 
complements) and generally reducing the demand for foreign technology 
by Indian firms. In the light industry group, such a policy would 
also have a small positive effect on local inventive activity. 
Second, what little evidence there is suggests that local inventive 
activity is positively associated with the presence of state-owned 
enterprises in an industry and negatively related to the presence of 
forei~u-based companies. This has important implications for 
government policy toward multinational corporations. 
Finally, the absence of a strong positive relationship between 
local innovation and average firm size should influence government 
policy toward large industrial units and business houses. The 
argument that government restrictions on firm size (prompted primarily 
by equity considerations) reduce innovation in India does not find 
support in the results presented in this paper. 
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It should, of course, be realized that government policy is based 
on several other objectives with which the above policy actions may 
not be consistent. For instance, nothing is said about productive 
efficiency in this paper. It may be that public-sector firms, 
although better at local innovation than other firms, may not be the 
leaders in profitability or factor productivity. Similarly, a policy 
to encourage small businesses and firms may not always be consistent 
with high investment and rapid growth in the economy. As with all 
policy prescriptions, these caveats have to be borne in mind when 
using the empirical results of this paper for policy purposes. 
8. SUMMARY 
We have reported evidence in this paper that Indian industrial 
firms do engage in inventive activity and in the purchase of foreign 
technology. The legal and institutional setting in India appears to 
be generally conducive to enabling both domestic inventive activity 
and technology purchase to benefit from international invention. This 
finding is strongest in the light and chemical industries. It does 
not follow, however, that the legal and institutional setting cannot 
be improved. 
The finding that foreign technology purchase is increased because 
of increases in international invention is open to the interpretation 
that payments per·unit of technology might have increased. Further 
study is required to determine whether the real quantity of technology 
purchase does increase with greater international inventive activity. 
Further study is also required to determine the effects of general 
industrial policies such as tariffs and licensing on domestic 
innovation and foreign technology purchase. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) Expenditures are in current terms. Inflation rates in India 
over this period were low -- less than 4 per· cent per year. 
2) Comparable firm-level data can be obtained from a number of 
secondary sources. The authors are currently engaged in assembling
these data for over 1,000 Indian firms in all industries. 
3) As part of an N.S.F. research project on technology choice and 
innovation in less-developed countries, the authors -- along with Kent 
Mikkelsen -- are engaged in a primary survey of selected firms in the 
agricultural machinery industries of India and the Philippines It is 
hoped that the survey will shed more light on informal innovation 
effort by firms in less-developed countries. 
4) A random effects model was not estimated since it requires an 
identical number of time-series observations for each cross-sectional 
unit. In our case, data for several industries were not available for 
each of the years between 1960 and 1970. Forcing the data into a 




1) Data on technology imports and on foreign equity share were 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Collaboration in 
Indian Industry: Survey Report, Bombay: Reserve Bank of India, 1968, 
for the period 1960-61 to 1963-64, and from the Reserve Bank of India, 
Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry: Second Survey Report 1974, 
Bombay: Reserve Bank of India, 1974, for the period 1964-65 to 
1969-70. 
2} Data on the fuel price index was obtained from India, Planning 
Commission, Statistics and Surveys Division, Basic Statistics Relating 
to the Indian Economy 1950-51 to 1970-71, New Delhi, 1972. 
3} Data on the public sector in production was obtained from the 
Commerce Yearbook of the Public Sector, Bombay: Commerce Publications, 
1974. 
4) Data on number of patents granted in the U.S. were obtained, 
tabulated by industry, directly from the U.S. Patent Office. 
5) Data on patenting by nationals in India were hand tabulated 
directly from actual patent applications on file at the New Delhi 
office of the Indian Patent Office. Data on approximately 42,000 
patents granted through 1979 were collected. A relatively complete 
concordance of the Indian patent classification with the Indian 
industrial classification was also possible. Only 5,845 of the 41,588 
patents in the basic file were in classes where assignments to 
industries proved unreasonable. 
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